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the lienor. Landreth Mach. Co. v. Roney, 185 Mo. App. 474, 171 S.W. 681 (1914) ;
Sowden & Co. v. Craig, 26 Ia. 156, 96 Am. Dec. 125 (1868); St. Mary's Mach.
Co. v. Iola Mills Co., 97 Kans. 464, 155 Pac. 1077 (1916) ; King v. Blickgeldt, 111
Wash. 508, 191 Pac. 748 (1920). It is on this ground that the instant case is
decided. In re Superior Drop Forge & Mfg. Co., 208 Fed. 813 (N.D. Ohio E.D.
1913) creates an apparent exception, holding that an express agreement that
property will remain personalty defeats the lienor's priority; but applies this
rule only when the property can be removed without damage to the realty. What
notice is sufficient to defeat the lienor's right is a disputed question. Whether the
recording of a chattel mortgage or conditional sales contract binds an encum-
brancer of realty without notice is not decided in the instant case, but the courts
are clearly divided with Illinois, Sword v. Low, 122 Ill. 487, 13 N.E. 826 (1887) ;
New Jersey, Keeler v. Keeler, 31 N.J.E. 181 (1879) ; New York, Ford v. Cobb,
20 N.Y. 344 (1859); and the Federal courts, In re Atlantic Beach Corp., 244
Fed. 828 (S.D. Fla. 1917), holding that it does; and New Hampshire, Tibbets
v. Home, 65 N.H. 242, 23 A. 145 (1889) ; Ohio, Brennan v. Whitaker, 15 Oh. St.
446 (1864); and Texas, Phillips v. Newsonte, 179 S.W. 1123 (Tex. Civ. App.
1915), taking a contrary stand. At any rate actual notice is preferable to con-
structive notice by recording. Where no ground of lack of notice was present,
conditiobal vendor's rights have come before those of mechanic lienors. Sow-
den & Co. v. Craig, supra, which holds that annexation to realty did not extin-
guish conditional sales vendor's rights, even though the article was sold expressly
for annexation. Likewise a chattel mortgage prevails over a mechanic's lien
where sufficient notice is had. Edwards & B. Lminber Co. v. Rank, 57 Neb. 323,
77 N.W. 765 (1899). One case goes to the extreme and declares that the very
act of recording prevents annexation and ipso facto bars mechanic lienholders.
St. Mary's Mach. Co. v. Iola Mill & Elevator Co., supra. In Wisconsin the exact
situation has not yet come up, but Kendall Mfg. Co. v. Rundle, 78 Wis. 150, 47
N.W. 364 (1890), passing upon the Wisconsin statute (Cf. 289.01 Wis. Stats.
(1931) declaring that "such lien shall be prior to any other lien which originates
subsequent to the commencement of the construction and repairs," holds that a
mechanic's lien has priority over a recorded chattel mortgage. It is very likely
then that in this state the conditional vendor's only remedy would be the filing
of a materialman's lien, and thus come in on an equal basis with the mechanic
lienholder.
EDWARD HERMSEN
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-VILLAGES-FINDINGS OF FAcT.-An application by
taxpayers residing within a particular area for the incorporation of such area
as the village of St. Francis was objected to by the city of Milwaukee and
eleven electors and taxpayers residing within s iid territory. Although the right
of the city of Milwaukee to object under an annexation petition signed by no
electors and one-half of the property owners of a certain area was denied, the
application for incorporation was not granted, the trial court finding that the
territory involved was largely rural in character and concluding that the sector
did not have the necessary characteristics to entitle it to be incorporated as a
village. Appeal taken. Held, Affirmed; evidenced found to support trial court's
conclusion. In re Village of St. Francis, (Wis. 1933), 245 N.W. 841.
There is no constitutional limitation upon the power of the Wisconsin legis-
lature to incorporate cities or villages, as to area and density of population, ex-
cept such as may be implied from the use of the words, "cities and villages,"
RECENT DECISIONS
in the Wisconsin Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 3, and from Art. IV, Sec. 23, pro-
viding, "The legislature shall establish but one system of town and county gov-
ernment, which shall be as nearly uniform as possible." It has been held that
the inclusion of sparsely settled rural land, not possessing the distinctive char-
acteristics of a village, would be violative of such constitutional provisions.
Fenton v. Ryan, 140 Wis. 353, 122 N.W. 756 (1909). Territory seeking incorpo-
ration as a village must be harmonious with the idea of what a village actually
is. [(A village means an assemblage of houses less than a city but nevertheless
urban or semi-urban in its character, and having a density of population greater
than can usually be found in rural districts.) State ex rel. Holland v. Lammers,
113 Wis. 398, 86 N.W. 677, 89 N.W. 501 (1902). See also, State ex rel. Childs v.
Village of Minnetonka, 57 Minn. 526, 59 N.W. 972, 25 L.R.A. 755 (1894).]
In the instant case the application for incorporation was denied and the
territory involved was found not to possess urban characteristics despite the fact
that the, appellant's brief indicated the presence of "modern steam, electric and
bus transportation, concrete and paved roads, a modem sewerage system, city
telephone service, city gas service, ash and garbage collection, electric street
lights, heavy traffic conditions requiring a modem police system," and in the
face of previous judicial intimations that the Milwaukee metropolitan area, of
which the St. Francis district is a portion, might be regarded as a single com-
pact urban territory. See Watts v. Rent-a-Ford Co., 205 Wis 140, 236 N.W. 521
(1931) ; Milwaukee v. Railroad Contmission, 206 Wis. 339, 240 N.W. 521 (1932) ;
Thielen v. Metropolitan Sewerage Commission, 178 Wis. 34, 189 N.W. 484 (1922) ;
"In the Matter of the Application of the T.M.E.R.&L. Co. for an Investigation
into the Characteristics of the Single Fare Area, etc., R-3610," and "In the
Case of the City of Milwaukee v. T.M.E.R.&L. Co., R-3761," (1930) Wisconsin
Public Service Commission decisions.
Justifying its denying incorporation to the St. Francis area, the court em-
phasized the lack of continuity of development and lack of community exchange
existing between the various portions of the proposed village, feeling that in-
corporation into a village would be bringing into the lives of those living there
a new association and an unexpected and perhaps unnatural alliance. [On neces-
sity of community of interest see Cooley, Handbook of the Law of Municipal
Corporations, p. 47, § 13; also, State ex rel. Simpson v. Village of Alice, 112
Minn. 330, 127 N.W. 1119 (1910) ; State ex rel. Childs v. Village of Fridley Park,
61 Minn. 146, 63 N.W. 163 (1895).) This emphasis seems to negative an earlier
decision which suggested that there might be incorporated as a village two
or more assemblages of inhabitants living at some distance from each other with
spaces of inhabited land intervening when such intervening spaces were also
included in such village. Smzith v. Sherry, 50 Wis. 210, 6 N.W. 561 (1880).
It is interesting to compare the present case with the decision in In re Village
of Chenequa, 197 Wis. 163, 221 N.W. 856 (1928), in which case the court upheld
the incorporation of an area containing no stores or other places of business
except one filling station and one summer resort, and containing over five acres
of land per capita. To the contention that the area of the village included rural
land not reasonably necessary for future growth, the trial court, pausing to re-
mark that such land, if level, might be "suitable for aeroplane landing," argued
that the "area was cursed with high steep hills some forty feet high, or pot-
holes or depressions forty feet deep," and therefore -was not agricultural, rather
completely ignoring the possibility of land being neither agricultural nor urban
in character. It might be admitted that the Dakota Badlands and Sahara desert
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are not rural in character, yet it might well be contended that they are not suit-
able for inclusion within village boundaries. Reconciling the St. Francis and
Chenequa cases is rather difficult, although it is true that in the St. Francis
case the court claims that the Chenequa residents had "a common interest which
induced in a natural way communication and exchange between them for a
community purpose," a condition of neighborly dependence presumably absent
in the St. Francis district.
Inasmuch as the trial judge in the one case denied and in the other granted
the application for incorporation, the only plausible basis for reconciling the two
cases is upon the general judicial unwillingness to disturb the findings of fact of
a trial judge, unless such findings are against the clear preponderance of the
evidence or a mistake has been made in applying the law. It is generally con-
ceded that specific findings of fact are accorded great weight on appeal due to
the superior advantages of the trial court in seeing and observing the witnesses.
Ticknor v. Sinclair, 187 Wis. 71, 203 N.W. 927 (1925) ; In re Oswald's Will, 172
Wis. 345, 178 N.W. 462 (1920) ; Huntington v. Burdeau, 149 Wis. 263, 135 N.W.
845 (1912). They are practically conclusive unless the clear weight or decided
preponderance of evidence is the other way; findings must quite clearly appear
to be wrong after all reasonable doubts are resolved in their favor. 3 Bryant,
Wisconsin Pleading and Practice (2nd ed.) p. 355, § 502. Except for this judicial
unwillingness to reverse trial courts' findings of fact, it is difficult to under-
stand why a rambling summer colony, with its planeless landing fields, "high
steep hills" and five acres per capita was permitted incorporation as a village
while another area with all of the attributes of a village such as clusters of
houses, improved streets, street lights, and municipal public service facilities was
denied such incorporation.
ROBERT W. HANSEN
WATERS AND WATER COURSES-INSUFFICIENCY OF SUPPLY-LIABILITIES TO
INDIvIDUALS.-A water company under a franchise granted by the city, owned
and operated the water distribution system in the city. A Stock Yards Company
owned improved property in the city. This property was destroyed by fire, when
the pressure on the hydrants fell below that required by a provision of the
fronchise, requiring "sufficient pressure for the extinguishing fires at any point
in the city." Action by the Stock Company against the Water Company for
damages for the breach of the contract. Held, that the Water Company was
liable for breach. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Farmers' Co-op. Stock Yards Co.,
(Ky. 1932), 54 S.W. (2d) 364.
This recent decision is a re-affirmation of an established Kentucky doctrine.
However, while it is upheld in Kentucky, and two other states, the general rule
followed by the remainder of the jurisdictions, state and federal, is that there is
no liability upon a water company for injuries sustained, in the absence of an
express contract, for failure to maintain sufficient pressure, in an action by
an individual. German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Ho, me Water Supply Co., 226
U.S. 220, (1912) ; Luning Mineral Products Co. v. East Bay Water Co., 70 Cal.
App. 94, 232 Pac. 721, (1924) ; City of Galena v. Galena Water Co., 229 Ill. 128,
82 N.E. 421 (1907) ; Hall v. Passaic Water Co., 83 N.J.L. 771, 85 A. 349 (1912) ;
Becker v. Keokuk Waterworks, 79 Iowa 419, 44 N.W. 694 (1890). This view i&"
taken in this type of case by the common law, and is reenacted in the statutes
of the Public Service Acts in the various states, Cf. Sec. 196.58, Wisconsin
Statutes (1931), requiring reasonably adequate service. They merely continue the
